In this paper we overview the existing home network DRM schemes and especially Philips' invention. Then we propose to use the proxy signature to simplify the authentication of certificate chain in Philips' scheme. And we also give an efficient scheme of proxy signature based on the characters of certificate chain. We then give a detailed security analysis to show that our scheme meets the six properties of proxy signature. Finally the paper points that we should go ahead to improve the efficiency of home network DRM scheme and show a kinder interface to digital home consumers.
INTRODUCTION
Digital contents are the main application in digital home. Home network Digital Rights management (DRM) is required by content providers to protect high-value digital assets and control their distribution and usage. In digital home DRM, Authorized Domains (AD) are introduced by DVB (Digital Video Broadcasting) as a means to enable the consumer be free to access and distribute contents within the entire home network.
There are several AD based home network DRM schemes. Philips's invention is one of them and based on certificate chains. The main problem in it is low efficiency and long feedback delay because of complex protocols and weak computing capability of consuming devices. So we should try to reduce the amount of protocol steps, or computation to improve efficiency and reduce the delay.
In this paper we will propose an efficient proxy signature scheme to simplify the device authentication protocol on content demanding in Philips invention. This proxy signature scheme could also be used in proxy signature scenario of home network. And this scheme is also an example to improve the efficiency of home DRM protocols and get a good person kind interface in home network DRM.
The rest of paper will be arranged as follows:
Section 2 gives an overview of the home network DRM schemes. Then we propose the proxy signature to simplify the authentication protocol on content demanding in section 3. In section 4 we detail the efficient proxy signature scheme. In section 5 we give a security analysis to show that our scheme meets the six properties of proxy signature. Finally in section 6 we conclude it and give the future works.
OVERVIEW OF HOME NETWORK DRM SCHEMES
A number of implementations of AD-like DRM systems are known. The SmartRight system (Smartright technical white paper, 2005) has been proposed by Thomson Electronic, and relies on smart cards modules incorporated into CE devices. This scheme is mainly based on public key certificates and devices in the domain share the same symmetric domain key, which is used to encrypt the protected contents. The main drawback of this approach is its poor designed protocols and that it's hard to revoke devices and update the domain key.
The , 2005) is based on the idea that an authorized domain is set up with a central device administering the network. When a device enters the network, the central device registers the entering device and issues a domain certificate to the entering device. This invention designs a certificate chain, illustrated in Fig. 1 , contains the following certificates:
The (external) Certificate Authority (CA) root certificate, self-signed and is used to sign device certificates. The device certificate, signed by the CA root private key and containing the device public key. The AD root certificate, which is generated by the ADM (AD Manager) at AD setup and which signs a new key pair. The private key corresponding to this certificate will be used to issue AD device certificates. The AD device certificate, issued by the ADM when the device joins an AD. Philips' scheme is suitable for today's digital home, which is centralized in management but distributed in location. And the public key encryption is also more popular than broadcast encryption in today's consuming devices. When the portable device 103 demands content from content provider 201, the device 103 should show the content provider 201 not only its device certificate, which is issued by device manufacturer (CA Root), but also its AD device certificate. Since the certificate is in chain and the content provider only trusts the CA Root, the device 103 should show content server 201 the device's AD device certificate, AD Root Certificate and the ADM's certificate. And the content provider 201 verifies all the certificates in turn. The certificate chain makes much complexity in authentication.
THE AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL ON CONTENT DEMANDING
We notice that the certificate chain could be expressed by proxy signature. So we try to use proxy signature to simplify the authentication.
There're many paper about proxy signature, the primary schemes are (Mambo et al., 1996 a) (Mambo et al., 1996 b) (Usuda et al., 1996) (Kim et al., 1997) (Jiguo, 2002) .
M-U-O proxy signature schemes (Mambo et al., 1996 a) (Mambo et al., 1996 b) are the first two schemes of proxy signature but donnot provide nonrepudiation. It is impossible to decide who is the actual signer of a proxy signature in their schemes. Another drawback of these schemes is that they require a secure channel to transmit the proxy signature key from the original signer to the proxy signer. Anyone who can intercept this proxy signature key can impersonate the proxy signer. (Usuda et al., 1996) (Kim et al., 1997) (Jiguo, 2002) give some improvement to M-U-O's scheme.
But they all have the drawbacks that the protocols are too complicated to consuming devices.
In the next section, we will give an efficient scheme. And it also meets the six properties of the proxy signature-Unforgeability, Verifiability, Undeniability, Distinguishability, Proxysigner's Deviation and Stong Identifiability.
AN EFFICIENT SCHEME OF PROXY SIGNATURE
We suppose that the CA Root has the private key Since σ has the hash of 1 H , so this message should not send in secure channel since no one can impersonate ADM.
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σ has the hash of 2 H , so this message shouldn't send in secure channel since no one can impersonate AD Root.
Step ( 
CONCLUSION
In this paper we overview the existing home network DRM schemes. And then we give an efficient proxy signature scheme to simplify the device authentication on content demanding in the Philips scheme. Finally we analyze the security of our scheme. And this efficient scheme is also an example to improve the efficiency of home DRM protocol and get a kinder interface to consumers. The proxy signature could be used not only in device authentication, but also on the scenarios when mobile device acts as an agent of the central administering device and the family member takes the charge of AD administrator. And we should think over other security technologies to improve the efficiency of home DRM protocol also.
